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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
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granting summary judgment for the defendant ABCO 
Engineering Corporation and against the plaintiff Kenneth 
E. White in a products liability personal injury case 
founded on diversity jurisdiction. Our opening sentence, 
describing an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York (in the Second 
Circuit) should raise eyebrows, and compels immediate 
inquiry into how such review could take place. The 
legitimacy of the review depends on whether White's claims 
against ABCO were properly transferred to the Third 
Circuit. Resolution of this question turns on one legal 
question of first impression and one factual question: (1) 
whether a S 1404(a) inter-district transfer may validly be 
made by stipulation (in the absence of a judicial balancing 
exercise), and (2) whether the transferring judge in this 
case made a de facto severance of the White/ABCO claims, 
purposely attempting to transfer only the White claims 
against a third party, Hamm's Sanitation. 
 
We conclude that S 1404(a) transfers may not be made 
simply by stipulation, and insofar as the record reveals, the 
transferring judge did not engage in the requisite 
independent balancing of S 1404(a) factors. Alternatively, 
even if there had been a valid transfer, the transferring 
judge effectively severed the claims against ABCO, leaving 
them in the Second Circuit. We will therefore transfer the 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1631. 
 
I. 
 
After White was injured working on a conveyor belt, he 
brought suit in the Southern District of New York against 
ABCO, the manufacturer of the conveyor belt, alleging 
defective design and negligence for failure to provide 
adequate safety guards. He later amended his complaint to 
state a direct claim against Hamm's Sanitation, the solid 
waste collector which had fabricated the side barrier guards 
for the ABCO conveyor at issue, alleging negligence in the 
installation, alteration, repair, and control of the conveyor.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. ABCO had previously joined Hamm's Sanitation as a Third-Party 
Defendant. 
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White also filed a separate suit against Hamm's Sanitation 
in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, making 
the same claim. 
 
In September 1997, the Southern District of New York 
case was transferred by United States District Judge 
Barrington Parker to Magistrate Judge Mark D. Fox for all 
purposes permitted by 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1) of the Federal 
Magistrates Act.2 In November Judge Parker granted 
ABCO's motion for summary judgment. In December all 
parties agreed to proceed before Magistrate Judge Fox 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636(c)(1), which provides that upon 
consent of the parties, a magistrate judge "may conduct 
any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and 
order the entry of judgment in the case." 28 U.S.C. 
S 636(c)(1). 
 
On January 9, 1998, White and Hamm's Sanitation 
stipulated that White's direct actions against Hamm's 
Sanitation would be transferred to the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey where, as noted above, a case was 
already pending between the parties. The stipulation, which 
was signed by Magistrate Judge Fox and the lawyers for 
both White and Hamm's Sanitation, clearly indicated that 
the parties intended to transfer only the White claims 
against Hamm's Sanitation.3 Presumably ABCO's counsel 
received notice of the transfer from the Clerk, but she 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A judge may unilaterally assign a magistrate judge to determine most 
pretrial matters, excepting, among other things, "a motion for injunctive 
relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment . . . to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 
to involuntarily dismiss an action." 28 U.S.C.S 636(b)(1). 
 
3. The stipulation provided: "It is hereby stipulated and agreed as and 
between Plaintiff, Kenneth White and Defendant, Hamm's Sanitation, 
Inc. that Plaintiff's direct actions against Hamm's Sanitation, Inc. 
stemming from the above shall be transferred for prosecution in the 
United States District Court, District of New Jersey." The stipulation, 
whose caption included the names of all the parties, was signed "so 
ordered" by Magistrate Judge Fox on January 8, 1998. Since several 
other facts compel our conclusion that we do not have jurisdiction in 
this case, we need not reach the question whether S 636(c)(1) or 
S 636(b)(1)(A) confer upon a Magistrate Judge the power to transfer a 
case to another district court. 
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neither objected to nor signed the stipulation. Magistrate 
Judge Fox notified Judge Parker that the case against 
Hamm's Sanitation had been transferred. On January 26, 
1998, Judge Parker amended his earlier opinion, but again 
granted summary judgment for ABCO. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
The authority for the transfer to the District of New 
Jersey is not recited in the order. The most obvious source 
is 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) which provides: "For the convenience 
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district 
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought."4 This section 
makes no mention of transfer by stipulation, in contrast to 
the succeeding section which allows for transfer by "motion, 
consent or stipulation of all parties," but only for (intra- 
court) inter-division, not inter-district transfer. See 28 
U.S.C. S 1404(b). The implication of the juxtaposition of 
these rules is that inter-district transfer by stipulation is 
inappropriate. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10138 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("It 
should be recalled that the parties, with court approval, 
can only stipulate to transfer a civil action to another 
division within a district, but not to another district."). This 
conclusion is supported by the history and policies 
undergirding S 1404(a). 
 
By its terms, S 1404(a) requires that a court make a case 
specific determination that such a transfer is proper. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. A transfer is typically deemed to be complete when the files of a case 
are lodged in the transferee court. See 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2dS 3846 (2d Ed. 1986). 
When the papers are sent, "the transferor court--and the appellate court 
that has jurisdiction over it--lose all jurisdiction over the case and may 
not proceed further with regard to it." Id.  According to the docket 
sheet, 
the files were all sent to New Jersey after the stipulated transfer. The 
New Jersey file, which we have examined, contains the Southern District 
of New York papers. Be that as it may, shifting papers cannot validate 
an otherwise invalid transfer, or extend the scope of a limited transfer. 
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Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 
(1988). "The idea behind S 1404(a) is that where a `civil 
action' to vindicate a wrong--however brought in a 
court--presents issues and requires witnesses that make 
one District Court more convenient than another, the trial 
judge can, after findings, transfer the whole action to the 
more convenient court." Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL- 
585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960) (emphasis added). In Stewart 
Organization, the Court concluded that a forum selection 
clause in a contract was relevant, but not binding, in a 
S 1404(a) determination. "The district court also must weigh 
in the balance the convenience of the witnesses and those 
public-interest factors of systemic integrity and fairness 
that, in addition to private concerns, come under the 
heading of `the interest of justice.' " Id. at 29. The Court 
stated that "[a] motion to transfer underS 1404(a) thus 
calls on the district court to weigh in the balance a number 
of case-specific factors." Id. 
 
No such requirement attends a S 1404(b) transfer, which 
is much less cumbersome than its inter-district 
counterpart. A case that is the subject of an intra-district 
(S 1404(b)) transfer can be handled by the same lawyer(s) 
and will be governed by the same rules and procedures. A 
case that is the subject of a S 1404(a) transfer is unloaded 
onto an entirely new system. The former is like moving a 
card table within a house from the living room to the 
kitchen; the latter is like collecting all the chips and going 
to the neighbor's house to play. The house rules, as any 
gamesperson knows, are usually different. For these 
reasons, the stipulated transfer of any of White's claims is 
highly problematic. There is no indication in the record that 
Magistrate Judge Fox engaged in the "flexible and 
multifaceted analysis that Congress intended to govern 
motions to transfer within the federal system." Stewart 
Organization, 487 U.S. at 31.5 
 
We acknowledge that we have, in dicta, stated that 
written findings of fact and law need not always accompany 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Had Magistrate Judge Fox engaged in such an evaluation, perhaps he 
might have decided that a S 1404(a) transfer was appropriate. We can 
only speculate. 
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a transfer order. See Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 
754 (3d Cir. 1973). While scolding the district court for 
failing to do so in a difficult case, the Plum Tree panel noted 
that "we have not imposed a requirement that district 
courts make findings of fact and conclusions of law with 
respect to the three factors stated in 28 U.S.C.S 1404(a) on 
each transfer motion." Id. at 756. The Supreme Court's 
Stewart Organization decision focused on the requirement 
of considering multiple factors, not the requirement of 
stating them, so Plum Tree's dicta is undisturbed. 
 
We do not need to decide whether a court must always 
state the reasons for every S 1404(a) transfer. We do note, 
however, that in the absence of anything but a scrawled "so 
ordered" under a stipulation to transfer, there is every 
indication that the court relied on the stipulation alone in 
its decision to transfer and failed to engage in the requisite 
balancing. Accordingly, we conclude that the transfer was 
invalid, and none of White's claims against ABCO, or 
anyone else, were transferred out of the Second Circuit. 
 
B. 
 
Even had Magistrate Judge Fox engaged in the requisite 
balancing before transferring the case, however, we would 
still not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal for several 
reasons. First, even appropriate stipulated transfers require 
the consent of all affected parties. See S 1404(b); 15 Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction 2d S 3844 (2d Ed. 1986). In this case, it does 
not appear that ABCO stipulated or otherwise consented to 
having its dispute with White transferred to New Jersey. 
Although S 1404(a) contemplates transfer without the 
consent of all the parties, for transfer to be effective all 
relevant parties must be apprised that the court is 
considering a transfer and have the opportunity to voice 
opposition. See id. There is no evidence that ABCO was 
given an opportunity to oppose the transfer in this case, or 
that it was informed that its rights might be affected by it. 
 
A better interpretation of Magistrate Judge Fox's order is 
that the transfer was preceded by a severance. Nothing 
within S 1404 prohibits a court from severing claims 
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against some defendants from those against others and 
transferring the severed claims. See id.S 3845 & nn.27-29. 
Before effecting such a severance, a judge should weigh the 
convenience to the parties requesting transfer against the 
potential inefficiency of litigating the same facts in two 
separate forums. See Sunbelt Corp. v. Nobel, Denton & 
Associates, Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 33 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that 
a court " `should not sever if the defendant over whom 
jurisdiction is retained is so involved in the controversy to 
be transferred that partial transfer would require the same 
issues to be litigated in two places' ") (quoting Liaw Su Teng 
v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1148 (5th Cir. 
1984)). In this case, however, although the underlying facts 
are intertwined, Magistrate Judge Fox could have properly 
concluded that the interests of judicial economy dictated 
such a severance and transfer. 
 
Rule 21 allows that "[a]ny claim against a party may be 
severed and proceeded with separately." F.R.C.P. Rule 
21(b). Although Magistrate Judge Fox never made a formal 
Rule 21 severance, all involved parties treated the case as 
if it had been so severed, with White and Hamm's 
Sanitation transferred to New Jersey, while White's claims 
against ABCO remained in New York for purposes of appeal.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509 (10th 
Cir. 1991), the court concluded that a S 1404(a) transfer effectively 
transferred all parties and claims in the case. Chrysler dealt with a case 
which had been explicitly bifurcated pursuant to a Rule 42(b) motion, 
which allows for the separate trials of claims within an action "in 
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials 
will be conducive to expedition or economy." F.R.C.P. 42(b). The court 
was careful to distinguish this situation from one in which claims had 
been severed pursuant to Rule 21. A separation pursuant to Rule 42(b) 
separates elements of the complaint for trial, but all the aspects 
"remain[ ] part of one single action which would result in a single 
judgment." Id. at 1519. On the other hand, if claims are severed 
pursuant to Rule 21 they "become independent actions with separate 
judgments entered in each." Id. Nothing on the face of Rule 21 indicates 
that it must be explicitly invoked in order to have effect. There must be, 
however, a strong indication that the judge intended to effect a 
severance. See Allied Elevator v. East Texas State Bank of Buna, 965 
F.2d 34, 36 (5th Cir. 1992). Magistrate Judge Fox's actions demonstrate 
that he had such an intention. 
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In a letter from Magistrate Judge Fox to Judge Parker on 
January 8, 1998, the "Re" line reads "White v. Hamm's 
Sanitation, Inc." and the body of the letter states that "the 
parties have consented to transfer the case to New Jersey." 
There is no mention of ABCO as one of "the parties." More 
importantly, Judge Parker continued to exercise jurisdiction 
over the White/ABCO dispute in the Southern District of 
New York, not only by his Opinion of January 26, 1998, 
but also by his October 8th, 1998 order that dismissed all 
claims against ABCO. Finally, White treated the ABCO 
controversy as being alive in New York, not New Jersey, by 
filing his initial appeal in the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. 
 
In sum, even if White's other claims had been properly 
transferred, Magistrate Judge Fox effectively severed them 
from the claims against ABCO, and White's claims against 
ABCO would still have remained in the Southern District of 
New York. 
 
III. 
 
In view of the foregoing, the transfer order of Magistrate 
Judge Fox resulted in an invalid--and therefore 
ineffectual--inter-district transfer by stipulation. 
Alternatively, the order effected a valid severance. Under 
either scenario, jurisdiction over the ABCO/White claims 
was never validly transferred from the Southern District of 
New York to the District of New Jersey. Moreover, in a 
practical sense, the case in New Jersey is over and the case 
in New York is alive.7 Under these circumstances, the best 
course of action is to transfer the appeal to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1631. That section allows for transfers from an 
appellate court without jurisdiction to the appellate court in 
which the appeal should have been filed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note, however, that even if the transfer were treated as plenary 
and legitimate, the District of New Jersey has not entered a final 
judgment that makes any mention of ABCO. Lacking afinal order to 
review, we would not have jurisdiction to hear the merits. 
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